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El objetivo de este artículo es criticar la opinión común entre los estudiosos de 
Unamuno de que Miguel de Unamuno defendió una especie de argumento pragmático 
para la fe religiosa y que su noción de fe religiosa como “querer creer” debe identificarse 
con la “will to believe” (“voluntad de creer”) de William James. Cómo mostraré en este ar-
tículo, uno de los aspectos que hace el razonamiento de Unamuno filosóficamente rele-
vante es su habilidad de formular una defensa no pragmatista de la fe religiosa sin un 
compromiso previo a la verdad de ningún enunciado religioso o teológico y basada en 
nuestro anhelo de una existencia eterna mediante la Salvación de Dios.  
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The aim of this paper is to argue against the received view among Unamuno 
scholars that Miguel de Unamuno was defending a sort of pragmatic argument for reli-
gious faith and that his notion of religious faith as “querer creer” (“wanting to believe”) is 
to be identified with William James’s “the will to believe”. As I will show in this paper, 
one of the aspects that makes Unamuno’s reasoning philosophically relevant is his ability 
to formulate a non-pragmatist defense of religious faith without a prior commitment to 
the truth of any religious or theological statement and grounded in our longing for an 
endless existence through God’s Salvation. 
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Traditionally, scholars have assumed that Miguel de Unamuno’s no-
tion of religious faith as “querer creer” (“wanting to believe”) is to be iden-
tified with William James’s “will to believe” [for a detailed bibliographical 
survey, cf. Martínez (2006), pp. 271–292]. This alleged similarity has been 
taken for granted and the entire debate has focused on the biographical 
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task of attempting to discover whether Unamuno’s “querer creer” was an 
original position which he reached alone [cf. e.g., Hipólito Fernández 
(1961); Lago Bornstein (2009); Young (1964)] or whether it was due to 
the influence of William James’s works — and, more concretely, to 
Unamuno’s reading of The Varieties of Religious Experience and The Will to 
Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy [cf. e.g., Franz (1985); Martínez 
(2007); Nubiola and Martínez 2003)]. The aim of this paper is to show 
that Unamuno’s notion of religious faith as “querer creer” cannot be iden-
tified with William James’s “will to believe” and neither is Unamuno’s 
defense of religious faith construed on pragmatic grounds.  
The claim that Unamuno was following James when defending his 
conception of religious faith is comprehensible for several reasons. In 
fact, some years ago I myself defended that in his Del sentimiento trágico de 
la vida en los hombres y en los pueblos [Unamuno (1913b)] (The Tragic Sense of 
Life in Men and Nations [Unamuno (1913a)]), Unamuno was defending a 
sort of (unsuccessful) Pascalian, pragmatic argument for religious belief 
[cf. Oya (2017)]. Unamuno’s emphasis on the desirability of the kind of 
immortality promised by the Christian God and the fact that Unamuno 
was defending a non-cognitivist conception of religious faith (with its 
consequent emphasis on its practical content), together with Unamuno’s 
declared sympathy towards James and the very linguistic similarity be-
tween Unamuno’s “querer creer” and James’s “will to believe”, facilitates 
this reading. It is true that we would be extremely naive if we were to 
think that all these similarities were products of pure chance, but in fact 
it is also true that we would be even more naive if, for example, we did 
not realize that “querer” (“wanting”) and “will” are not synonyms, and 
that nowhere does Unamuno explicitly endorse James’s views. What I 
mean by this is that while it seems clear that Unamuno was well aware of 
Jamesian pragmatism and that he was somehow sympathetic to it, this 
does not show that Unamuno shared James’s views in any philosophical-
ly relevant sense. 
In fact, I think that Unamuno’s sympathy towards James can be ex-
plained not because their positions were analogous but because Unamuno 
thought they were addressing a similar question. The guiding line of 
Unamuno’s philosophical thought is the question of whether, once the 
failure of natural theology and therefore the impossibility of forming the 
belief that God exists on an evidential, rational basis is accepted, our (ac-
cording to Unamuno, natural) longing for the kind of immortality an-
nounced by Jesus Christ can provide some sort of justification for 
embracing religious faith. This was, at least to Unamuno’s reading, the 
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same question faced by James in his lecture “The Will to Believe” [James 
(1896)]: whether the practical adequacy of religious belief – its “practical 
cash-value”– which, contrary to Unamuno’s thought, for James does not 
only refer to the desirability of immortality, can justify “[...] our right to 
adopt a believing attitude in religious matters, in spite of the fact that our 
merely logical intellect may not have been coerced” [James (1896), p. 13]. 
Unamuno did not identify himself with James, but he probably found in 
James’s writings a competent interlocutor with inclinations and a tem-
perament similar to his own. 
What these authors’ really have in common is their aim of offering 
a nonevidential justification for religious faith — i.e., a justification for 
embracing religious faith without a prior commitment to the truth of any 
religious or theological statement. The similarities, however, end here. 
James’s defense of religious belief is construed on pragmatic grounds, as 
being something one willingly embraces after realizing its practical ade-
quacy. Furthermore, although James’s argument can be reconstructed as 
a justification for adopting a religious attitude – i.e., the legitimacy of engag-
ing in a religious practice, of acting as if the belief that God exists were 
true even if one is unable to believe that it is true –, James’s original in-
tention was to defend the legitimacy of religious belief — i.e., the ac-
ceptance as a truth of the factual claim that God exists. Unamuno, on 
the other hand, argued for a non-cognitivist conception of religious faith, 
which, as I will explain, is not reduced to a mere attitude but consists of 
adopting a religious understanding of the world, in seeing the world as a 
sort of personal conscious being and in coming to feel, through the prac-
tice of charity, as if it were a personal relationship between ourselves and 
God — from conscience to conscience, so to say. Moreover, Unamuno’s 
religious faith is not a matter of will, it is not something we voluntarily 
decide to embrace, but something we are all naturally (and so, inevitably) 
impelled to, given our human nature. 
William James’s argument in his lecture “The Will to Believe” stems 
from the claim that we cannot obtain conclusive evidence to form the 
belief that God exists or that He does not exist, in so far as the existence 
of God is a matter that goes beyond our experience. We are, then, not 
justified in forming the belief that God exists on an evidential basis. 
However, James says, religious belief can still be justified on pragmatic 
grounds: only if we believe that God exists, James argues, will we be able 
to attain those momentous consequences that follow when the religious 
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hypothesis is true and we believe it. Religious belief, then, is justified be-
cause of the beneficial consequences it brings with it.  
But what if it turns out to be the case that God does not in fact ex-
ist? One might argue that religious belief would then have no beneficial 
consequences and so would not be pragmatically justified. James’s an-
swer is that even if the theistic hypothesis turned out to be false and in 
the end God did not exist, religious belief would still be pragmatically 
justified in so far as its practical value does not rely exclusively on attain-
ing the momentous consequences that only appear when God actually 
exists. According to James, the mere believing that God exists has in itself 
practical consequences which are positive enough so as to pragmatically 
justify religious belief: a direct consequence of believing that God exists, 
which to James’s thinking is independent of whether He does in fact exist 
or not, is that “we are better off even now” [James (1896), p. 30].  
Unamuno’s defence of religious faith follows a completely different 
line of reasoning than James’s. In his major philosophical work, Del sen-
timiento trágico de la vida en los hombres y los pueblos, Unamuno argued for a 
natural, nonevidential foundation for religious faith; that is, according to 
Unamuno, religious faith is not justified because God does in fact exist 
or because of its practical adequacy, but because it is something we are 
naturally led to.  
Unamuno’s reasoning can be outlined as follows. Its starting point 
is the metaphysical claim that all singular things primarily and naturally 
seek an endless existence — i.e., Unamuno’s reasoning stems from the 
acceptance of a modified version of Spinoza’s conatus [cf. Unamuno 
(1913a), pp. 9-10; Unamuno (1913b), pp. 112-113]. Unamuno refers to 
this most basic and natural inclination of all singular things as the “ham-
bre de inmortalidad” (“hunger for immortality”) [cf. e.g., Unamuno (1913a), 
p. 42; Unamuno (1913b), p. 131]. As soon as we realize that only if God 
existed (and not any sort of god but the Christian God, the One who 
promises Resurrection) would this natural inclination be satisfied, we 
come to (mediately) long for the existence of such a God [cf. e.g., Una-
muno (1913a), p. 199: Unamuno (1913b), p. 217]. Unfortunately, despite 
our wanting Him to exist, Unamuno says, we are not justified on eviden-
tial, rational grounds for forming the belief that God exists or that He 
does not: arguments from natural theology fail in their purpose of show-
ing the existence of God and there is no philosophical argument which 
succeeds in demonstrating His non-existence [cf. e.g., Unamuno (1907a), 
p. 212; Unamuno (1907b), p. 261]. All we have is doubt.  
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This situation is what Unamuno called the “sentimiento trágico de la 
vida”, which is usually translated into English as “the tragic sense of life”, 
although I think it would be more accurate to translate it as “the tragic 
feeling of life”. The “sentimiento trágico de la vida” is the struggle (“agonía”) 
between our wanting an endless existence (and so, derivatively, our want-
ing God to exist) and our lack of evidential justification for believing that 
God exists (and so, our lack of evidential justification for believing that 
we will enjoy an endless existence). Since, according to Unamuno, our 
seeking an endless existence is a natural, non-intellectual inclination, the 
“sentimiento trágico de la vida” is not a theoretical conflict but a sentimental 
one, something that is intimately felt — which is why he calls it “senti-
miento” (“feeling”). On the other hand, the conflict is “trágico” (“tragic”) 
because it is taken to be irresolvable: we cannot override our lack of evi-
dential justification by voluntarily forming the belief that God exists (or 
that God does not exist) because our beliefs aim at truth – i.e., we cannot 
believe that P without believing that P is true [cf. e.g., Unamuno (1909), p. 
269] – and neither can we suspend our judgment and resign ourselves to 
doubt since this would amount to silencing our most basic natural incli-
nation [cf. e.g., Unamuno (1913a), pp. 20-21 and 45-46; Unamuno 
(1913b), pp. 119 and 133]. 
The irresolubility of the “sentimiento trágico de la vida”, our incapacity 
to escape from the uncertainty surrounding our enjoying an endless ex-
istence, causes us a sort of anguish. Our situation is so miserable, Una-
muno says, that we cannot but come to commiserate with ourselves. 
Moreover, once we realize the universality of this seeking an endless ex-
istence (i.e., that not only us human beings but all singular things primari-
ly and naturally seek an endless existence), we become aware that we are 
not alone in our miserable situation and that the whole world shares with 
us our tragic and anguished condition. And, Unamuno says, to claim that 
the whole world suffers as we do is to stop treating the world as a fact 
and start seeing it as a personal living being: inanimate things do not suf-
fer, only personal conscious living beings do. This is the process by 
which, according to Unamuno, the “sentimiento trágico de la vida” leads us 
to form a religious understanding of the world. Despite its length, I think 
reproducing the following quote will prove useful to clarify Unamuno’s 
reasoning on this point: 
 
Spiritual love for oneself, the compassion one feels for oneself, may per-
haps be called egotism, but nothing could be more opposed to common 
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ordinary egotism. For from this love or compassion for yourself, from this 
intense despair, from the knowledge that just as before you were born you 
did not exist so after you die you will be no more, you go on to feel com-
passion for – that is, to love – all your fellow beings and brothers in this 
world of appearance, those wretched shadows who file by, going from 
nothingness to nothingness, mere sparks of consciousness shining for a 
moment in the infinite and eternal darkness. And from feeling compassion 
for other men, for those akin to you, beginning with those most akin to 
you, for those you live among, you go on to feel compassion for everyone 
alive, and perhaps even for that which does not live but merely exists. 
That distant star shining up there in the night will one day be extinguished 
and turn to dust and cease shining and existing. And as with the one star, 
so it will be with the whole of the starry sky. Poor sky! [...] If I am moved 
to pity and love the luckless star which will one day vanish from the sky, it 
is because love, compassion, makes me feel that it possesses a conscious-
ness, more or less obscure, which causes it to suffer because it is no more 
than a star doomed to cease being itself one day. For all consciousness is 
an awareness of death and suffering. [...] And when love is so great and vi-
tal, so strong and overflowing, that it loves everything, then it personalizes 
everything and discovers that the total Whole, the Universe, is also a Per-
son with a Consciousness, a Consciousness which suffers, pities and loves, 
and is therefore consciousness. And this Consciousness of the Universe, 
which love discovers by personalizing whatever it loves, is what we call 
God [Unamuno 1913a, pp. 152-154].1 
 
This universal anguish awakens our compassion and we respond by 
commiserating with the whole world. And commiserating with someone 
presupposes a certain loving, affective relationship with whom we com-
miserate: we are not moved by those we do not care about at all, those 
towards whom we feel no affection [cf. Unamuno (1913a), pp. 150-151; 
Unamuno (1913b), p. 190]. This is why Unamuno says that our compas-
sion towards the whole world does not only lead us to treat the world as 
a conscious personal living Being, but also to loving Him [cf. Unamuno 
(1913a), pp. 226-228; Unamuno (1913b), p. 232]. And this love is ex-
pressed, Unamuno says, in the practice of charity, in a loving agapistic 
giving of ourselves to the whole world. Charity is the expression of our 
love and compassion since it constitutes our effort to liberate ourselves 
and the whole world from the spiritual pain and the tragic situation in 
which we all live: it is through the practice of charity that we come to 
feel as if we were part of others, thereby somehow surpassing our own 
individuality without ceasing to be the individuals of “carne y hueso” 
(“flesh and bone”) that we are here and now [cf. Unamuno (1913a), pp. 
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229-230; Unamuno (1913b), pp. 233-234]. And this is how this religious 
understanding of the world, which emerged from our “sentimiento trágico 
de la vida”, leads us to the practice of charity and through it to feel as if 
there were some sort of communion between us and the world as a Con-
science, as God [cf. Unamuno (1913a), pp. 302–308; Unamuno (1913b), 
pp. 272–276]. 
Unamuno’s religious faith emerges, then, as our reaction to the an-
guish resulting from what Unamuno called the “sentimiento trágico de la 
vida”. In turn, the “sentimiento trágico de la vida”, our longing for the exist-
ence of the Christian God despite our incapacity for believing that He 
exists, is a consequence of our longing for an endless existence — once 
we realize that only in the case that the Christian God exists would we 
enjoy an endless existence and we become aware of the failure of those 
philosophical arguments that purport to demonstrate the existence of the 
Christian God. Since this longing for an endless existence is, according 
to Unamuno, our most basic natural inclination, the “sentimiento trágico de 
la vida” is, in the end, a consequence of our own natural human condi-
tion — this is why Unamuno calls it “de la vida” (“of life”). It is here that 
it is important to emphasize that Unamuno’s reasoning does not rely, as 
is often read, on the psychological, contingent claim that we all desire an 
endless existence, but rather on the metaphysical claim that we (in fact, 
all singular things) naturally and primarily seek an endless existence. It is 
considering this longing for an endless existence as being metaphysically 
grounded in our human nature that allows Unamuno to conclude that re-
ligious faith, despite being a subjective reaction, is not an arbitrary one 
but one given by our own natural human condition. 
Related to this, something which is very important to emphasize is 
that Unamuno’s religious faith has no cognitive content at all. It does not 
consist in forming the belief that God exists or that the world corre-
sponds to a description of some state of affairs: the “sentimiento trágico de 
la vida”, the uncertainty regarding the existence of the Christian God 
(and so, the uncertainty regarding the eventual satisfaction of our natural 
longing for an endless existence), remains “trágico” (“tragic”), irresolvable 
[cf. e.g., Unamuno (1913a), p. 354; Unamuno (1913b), p. 300]. Unamuno’s 
notion of religious faith has no factual, cognitive content because it does 
not rely on any given state of affairs of the world, on the fact that the 
world is in such a way and not in another, but rather it emerges as a nat-
ural reaction of our own, as being something idiosyncratically human, 
independent of the state of affairs given in the world: our conceiving the 
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world as a personal living being is not grounded in any trait of the world 
but in our own natural human condition, and so it does not constitute a 
description of the world. 
Religious faith, therefore, arises from our longing for God to exist 
— and remember here that to Unamuno’s thinking we long for God in 
so far as it is only through God’s Salvation that our (alleged) natural in-
clination to seek an endless existence will be satisfied. But religious faith 
is not reduced to the mere desire for God to exist and that he Save us. 
As I have already said, Unamuno’s religious faith consists in adopting a 
religious understanding of the world, in seeing the world as a sort of per-
sonal conscious being. This religious understanding is a consequence of 
the “sentimiento trágico de la vida”; it is our reaction to our realizing that not 
only ourselves, human beings, but all singular things share with us our 
anguished condition in so far as they too primarily and naturally seek an 
endless existence. Since the “sentimiento trágico de la vida” is a direct conse-
quence of our own natural human condition – i.e., our reaction to be-
coming aware that only if the Christian God exists will our most basic 
and natural inclination be satisfied, but that unfortunately we are unable 
to discover whether this God exists – this religious understanding is ul-
timately a consequence of our own human nature too. Furthermore, this 
way of seeing the world as a personal living Being who suffers in the 
same way as we do is what moves us to the practice of charity, to a lov-
ing agapistic giving of ourselves to the whole world so as to liberate our-
selves and the rest of the world from the tragic situation in which we all 
live. And it is through this giving ourselves to the world that we come to 
feel as if we were in some sort of affective communion with the world, as if 
it were a personal relationship between us and the world as a Conscience. 
Charity and its related feeling of communion with God, then, are also a 
consequence of our own human natural condition. 
Unamuno’s notion of religious faith is not, then, a mere acting as if 
God existed. It is true that Unamuno’s religious faith has no cognitive or 
factual content — i.e., a religious understanding of the world is not a de-
scription of the world. And it is also true that the practical, ethical side of 
Unamuno’s religious faith is expressed through the practice of charity — 
i.e., in a loving, agapistic giving to the world. But Unamuno’s religious faith 
is not reduced to, and neither does it start with, an act. Unamuno’s reli-
gious faith is, essentially, a religious understanding of the world; it pri-
marily consists in stopping seeing the world as a fact and starting seeing 
it as a personal conscious Being. The important point is that we are not 
led to this religious worldview because of a prior commitment to act ac-
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cordingly with Unamuno’s charity, but it is just the opposite: charity is a 
consequence of conceiving the world as a personal living Being.  
I hope that it is now evident that Unamuno is not claiming a prag-
matic justification for religious faith. Unamuno, of course, recognizes the 
practical adequacy of the theistic hypothesis if it were true — in so far as if 
(the Christian) God were to exist, our most basic and natural inclination 
to enjoy an endless existence would be satisfied. However, it is not its 
practical value that justifies religious faith. Unamuno often makes claims 
like: 2 “[a]nd I still believe that if we all believed in our salvation from noth-
ingness, we would all be the better for it” [Unamuno (1913a), p. 49]3 and 
“[...] we must believe in that other life in order to live this life and endure it 
and endow it with meaning and finality” [Unamuno (1913a), p. 281)].4 
However, it is not clear to what extent Unamuno’s notion of religious faith 
has any practical value in itself. As I have already said, Unamuno’s religious 
faith has no factual content (i.e., it is a religious understanding of the 
world, but not a description of it) and so it does not justify our forming 
the belief that God exists — and therefore it does not put an end to the 
“sentimiento trágico de la vida”: the uncertainty regarding the satisfaction of 
our natural longing for an endless existence, and the anguish that accom-
panies that uncertainty, is our natural condition and so it will always per-
sist. In fact, doubt (and the anguish it causes in us) is essential to religious 
faith: if we were to have conclusive evidence for believing either that God 
exists or that He does not, the “sentimiento trágico de la vida” would not arise 
and, consequently, Unamuno’s religious faith would have no place. This 
shows again that it is not a pragmatic calculus regarding the beneficial con-
sequences of embracing religious faith, but rather our natural longing for 
an endless existence, and its universality among all singular things, which, 
according to Unamuno’s schema, leads us to religious faith. So, again: 
Unamuno’s religious faith is not a matter of will, it is not something we 
decide to embrace after realizing its “practical cash-value”, but some-
thing we are naturally (and so, inevitably) impelled to, given our own 
human nature. 
However, there are a few occasions when Unamuno seems to be 
saying that a conscious embracing of religious faith will somehow facili-
tate attaining an endless existence. Take the following quote from Del 
sentimiento trágico de la vida en los hombres y en los pueblos — and notice again 
that Unamuno is using “believing” here in a non-cognitive way, as refer-
ring to his notion of religious faith and not to the acceptance, as a truth, 
of the factual claim that God exists:  
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Who then shall be saved? And now the imagination suggests another pos-
sibility – neither more nor less rational than those possibilities interroga-
tively offered – and that is the thought that only those are saved who 
longed to be saved, that only those are made eternal who lived consumed 
by a terrible hunger for eternity and a need to be made eternal. Whoever 
longs never to die and who believes he will never die in spirit, desires it 
because he deserves it, or better, whoever longs for personal eternity does 
so because he already bears his immortality within him. Only the man who 
does not long, always and passionately, with a passion overwhelming all 
reason, for his own personal immortality does not deserve it. And there is 
no injustice in not giving a man something he does not know enough to 
desire: “Ask, and it shall be given you”. Perhaps each is given what he de-
sires. And perhaps the sin against the Holy Ghost, for which, according to 
the Gospel, there is no remission, is none other than that of not desiring 
God, that of not longing to be made eternal. [...] What cruelty is there in 
denying a man something he never desired nor could desire? [Unamuno 
(1913a), p. 271]5. 
 
As I have already said, all of Unamuno’s notion of the “sentimiento trágico 
de la vida” depends on the assumption that we cannot form the belief that 
God exists on an evidential, rational basis: a sincere man aiming at the 
truth in full use of his epistemic and cognitive capacities cannot come to 
form the belief that God exists. This seems to be a good reason for 
claiming that God, if He existed, would not punish our lack of belief that 
He exists – i.e., our not accepting, as a truth, the proposition that the 
world is such that He exists – by depriving us of attaining an endless ex-
istence. If He were to do this, He would not be punishing us but inflicting 
a gratuitous, undeserved (and hence unjust) evil. But this kind of behav-
iour would be inconsistent with the alleged all-good and all-loving nature 
essential to the sort of God Unamuno is referring to — i.e., the Christian 
God, who announces, through the figure of Jesus Christ, an agapistic giv-
ing to the world and the ultimate Resurrection of all the dead.  
However, and here comes Unamuno’s point in the previous quote, 
it does not seem to be something inconsistent with God’s alleged all-
good nature that He would punish us for not embracing Unamuno’s no-
tion of religious faith and engaging ourselves in a loving, agapistic giving 
to the world. After all, Unamuno would say, it is only a matter of hearing 
and acting in accordance with our own nature: a sincere man will be nat-
urally moved to conceive the world as a personal conscious Being and to 
the practice of charity with no difficulties at all. Rather, what would be 
an insincere act and would require a conscious effort would be to deny 
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religious faith, in as far as this would be tantamount to trying to perform 
an act of self-deception by pretending to act against our own nature.  
It is easy to see that this argument relies on Unamuno’s main con-
tention that religious faith is something we are naturally led to. But even 
conceding this, the argument still depends on other controversial as-
sumptions such as that God would cast eternal, infinite damnations as a 
response to earthly, finite sins — which is a claim some Christian philos-
ophers see as an unwarranted theological position. So, the argument is 
disputable for several reasons and this is why, I guess, Unamuno did not 
commit himself to this line of reasoning and he took care not to place 
too much emphasis on it (i.e., Unamuno explicitly says that he only con-
siders it as a possibility suggested by the imagination). 
We have seen, then, that Unamuno is not offering a pragmatic justifi-
cation for his notion of religious faith. In fact, Unamuno takes care to ex-
plicitly reject James’s pragmatist account of truth. 6 Despite this, Unamuno 
scholars have often read some of his texts as reflecting a somewhat implicit 
acceptance of a pragmatist theory of truth. One of the fragments usually 
quoted [cf. e.g., Martínez Hernández (1995), pp. 115-116] reads as follows:  
 
Talking to a peasant one day, I suggested to him the hypothesis that there 
might indeed be a God who governs heaven and earth, a Consciousness 
or Conscience of the Universe, but that even so it would not be sufficient 
reason to assume that the soul of every man was immortal in the tradi-
tional and concrete sense. And he replied: “Then, what good is God?” 
And that was the response, in the secret tribunal of their consciousness, of 
the man Kant and the man James. But in their role as professors they had 
to justify rationally an attitude in itself so little rational — which does not 
mean, of course, that such an attitude is absurd [Unamuno (1913a), p. 7]. 7 
 
This quote has often been read as if Unamuno were rejecting the possi-
bility of the existence of a non-Savior God simply because that sort of 
God would lack any practical value. This pragmatist reading comes, I im-
agine, from the common failure among Unamuno scholars to realize that 
Unamuno’s reasoning does not depend on the psychological, contingent 
claim that we all desire an endless existence but on the metaphysical 
claim that all singular things seek, as their most basic natural inclination, 
an endless existence. Once we become aware of Unamuno’s metaphysi-
cal assumption, the answer appears to be easy. Unamuno’s acceptance of 
a basic natural inclination commits him to also accepting that our moti-
vation for all we do is somehow reduced to this natural inclination. And 
96                                                                                           Alberto Oya 
teorema XXXIX/1, 2020, pp. 85-104 
this also includes the motivations that lead us to form our own beliefs. 
This does not, however, make Unamuno a pragmatist philosopher in any 
relevant sense of the term. What Unamuno is defending here is the claim 
that our processes of belief-formation are motivated by pragmatic, non-
epistemic reasons. But this does not imply that the beliefs we form are 
justified by pragmatic, non-epistemic reasons. That this was Unamuno’s 
opinion seems to be clear if we consider what he wrote in the second 
chapter of his Del sentimiento trágico de la vida en los hombres y en los pueblos: 
 
Men have long debated and long will continue to debate – the world hav-
ing been given over to their debates – concerning the origin of knowledge. 
But, leaving aside for the moment the question of what may constitute 
quintessential knowledge, it is certainly clear that in the apparential order 
of things, in the life of beings endowed with a certain more or less cloudy 
faculty of knowing and perceiving, or who at any rate appear to act as if 
they were so endowed, knowledge is exhibited to us as bound up with the 
necessity of living and of procuring the wherewithal to maintain life. It is 
consequent to that very essence of being, which according to Spinoza 
consists in striving to persevere indefinitely in its own being. Speaking in 
terms in which concreteness borders on vulgarity, we might say that the 
brain, in so far as its function is concerned, is in dependence of the stom-
ach. [...] Such then is what we may call the historical origin of knowledge, 
whatever may be its origin in other regards. Beings apparently endowed 
with perception perceive in order to live, and only to the degree they need 
to perceive in order to live. […] [T]he primordial fact is that curiosity 
sprang from the need to know in order to live, and this is the dead weight 
and gross matter which all knowledge and science carries in its womb. As-
piring as they do to knowledge for the sake of knowledge and truth for the 
sake of truth, science and knowledge are forced by the needs of life to place 
themselves at the service of these needs. And men, believing they seek the 
truth for its own sake, in fact seek life in the truth. The variety of 
knowledge and science depends upon the variety of human needs, and 
men of science usually work, willingly or unwillingly, knowingly or un-
knowingly, in the service of those in power, or in the service of a nation 
requiring from them confirmation of its drives. [...] Knowledge remains at 
the service of the need to go on living, primarily at the service of personal 
survival. And this need and this instinct have created in man the organs of 
knowledge and given them the range they have. Man sees, hears, touches, 
tastes and smells whatever he must see, hear, touch, taste, and smell in or-
der to go on living [Unamuno (1913a), pp. 26–28]8. 
 
Since all our motivations are reduced to our seeking an endless existence, 
and since a non-Savior God would not help us to attain that endless exist-
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ence, we are simply not motivated to try to discover whether this kind of non-
Savior God exists or not. But again, that we do not care about this does not 
mean that we are justified in believing that such a God does not exist.  
The above is related to Unamuno’s reasoning for claiming that we 
are not justified, on an evidential basis, to form the belief that God ex-
ists. However, to read Unamuno as if he were simply claiming that one 
should reject arguments from natural theology because they refer to a 
non-Savior God is nothing more than a caricature of what Unamuno 
says and a failure to capture the seriousness of his philosophical and the-
ological insights. Unamuno’s denial of natural theology is not that sim-
ple. Arguments from natural theology, Unamuno says, are construed as 
abductive inferences that aim to justify God’s existence as being the best 
explanation for some worldly given fact. However, the hypothesis that 
God exists has no explanatory power: 
 
For to say that the world is the way it is and not otherwise because God 
made it so, while at the same time we admit that we do not know why He 
made it so, is the same as saying nothing. And if we knew the reason why 
God made it as it is, then God is superfluous and the reason is sufficient 
in itself. [Unamuno (1913a), p. 178].9 
 
In fact, in claiming that the hypothesis that God exists has some sort of 
explanatory power regarding some given worldly event, we get tangled 
up in an erroneous theological conception that fails to capture the signif-
icance of religious faith by making God something akin to a non-
observable scientific theoretical entity. But it seems clear that for the 
common Christian man God is, of course, something quite different 
from an electron. God answers the “¿para qué?” (“wherefore?”) of the 
world, but not its “¿por qué?” (“why?”): God, through His Salvation, 
would give an ultimate meaning and purpose to the world, but by postu-
lating the existence of God we are not given any explanation as to why 
the world is such and such and not otherwise [cf. Unamuno (1913a), pp. 
168-171; Unamuno (1913b), pp. 200-201]. 
Unamuno’s conception of God, on the other hand, aims to pre-
serve the significance of religious faith by allowing our (alleged) longing 
for God, our waiting for God’s Salvation through Resurrection, even 
when we lack evidence to believe that such Salvation might actually oc-
cur. It is in this sense that Unamuno took his notion of religious faith to 
be an answer to the “¿para qué?”: an answer because it is the kind of God 
involved in Unamuno’s religious faith, the Christian God of the Resur-
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rection, who would answer that question, and not because Unamuno’s 
religious faith provides an answer to whether such God exists or not. 
Moreover, as I have already said, Unamuno’s religious faith is con-
strued upon our (alleged) longing for God’s existence and that He Save 
us. And this longing of ours is something affective, requiring us to con-
ceive God as a personal living Being (although it is still impossible for us 
to conceive Him as actually existing). This is how – and this is one of the 
most relevant and original aspects of Unamuno’s reasoning – Unamuno 
is able to formulate a non-cognitivist conception of religious faith that 
aims to preserve the affective relation between man and God without 
having to commit himself to the factual claim that God exists. 
Unamuno’s rejection of the arguments from natural theology relies 
on the notion of God assumed in these arguments failing to capture the 
significance of religious faith, because it does not succeed in preserving 
this affective relation: a first cause of the world is not the Christian God 
to whom we pray and in whom we wait. This is what Unamuno means 
when he contrasts the God of his faith, the “Dios-Biótico” (“Biotic-God”), 
the live God “[…] to whom man truly prays and whom man truly de-
sires” [Unamuno (1913a), p. 195],10 with the scholastic God of natural 
theology, the “Dios-Idea” (“God-Idea”), whom is neither loved nor de-
sired, but simply postulated as a cause of the world (as an answer to the 
“¿por qué?”). In short: Unamuno is not rejecting the success of arguments 
from natural theology on pragmatic grounds, just because the kind of 
God they aim to demonstrate does not help us to satisfy our natural 
longing for an endless existence. Rather, he rejects these arguments be-
cause the kind of God referred to in them fails to preserve the affective 
significance of religious faith, and this is so because the kind of God 
these arguments assume is a non-Savior God. 
So far I have argued that Unamuno’s defense of religious faith is not 
construed on pragmatic grounds. However, as I pointed out at the begin-
ning of this paper, Unamuno scholars have not only referred to his reading 
of The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, but they have also 
claimed that Unamuno’s reading of James’s The Varieties of Religious Experience 
influenced his own position. It should be noted, however, that there has 
been no explicit attempt to prove this connection and all the scholarly dis-
cussion has focused exclusively on the question I am addressing in this pa-
per; namely, whether or not Unamuno was defending a pragmatic 
argument for religious belief akin to that defended by James in his lecture 
“The Will to Believe”.  
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In contrast with his lecture “The Will to Believe”, which as I said be-
fore was explicitly formulated as a philosophical defense of religious belief, 
James conceived The Varieties of Religious Experience as a psychological de-
scriptive inquiry constructed from a scientific, naturalistic perspective 
aimed at identifying the common psychological traits among personal tes-
timonies of religious experience. Despite its psychological orientation, the 
book nonetheless has some interesting philosophical implications. In its 
last few pages, James states what he takes to be the main philosophical im-
plication of his psychological study, which is an argument for believing, not 
as a doubtless established conclusion but as a corrigible hypothesis, the re-
ality of a supernatural order — and by “hypothesis” James means “[...] 
something that may fit the facts so easily that your scientific logic will find 
no plausible pretext for vetoing your impulse to welcome it as true” [James 
(1902/2002), p. 394]. He states this argument as follows:  
 
Yet the unseen region in question is not merely ideal, for it produces ef-
fects in this world. When we commune with it, work it actually done upon 
our finite personality, for we are turned into new men, and consequences 
in the way of conduct follow in the natural world upon our regenerative 
change. But that which produces effects within another reality must be 
termed a reality itself, so I feel as if we had no philosophic excuse for call-
ing the unseen or mystical world unreal. [...] The only thing that it [reli-
gious experience] unequivocally testifies to is that we can experience union 
with something larger than ourselves, and in that union find our greatest 
peace. [...] [T]he practical needs and experiences of religion seem to me 
sufficiently met by the belief that beyond each man and in a fashion con-
tinuous with him there exists a larger power which is friendly to him and 
to his ideals. All that the facts require is that the power should be both 
other and larger than our conscious selves. Anything large will do, if only 
it be large enough to trust for the next step. It need not be infinite, it need 
not be solitary. It might conceivably even be only a larger and a more god-
like self, of which the present self would then be but the mutilated expres-
sion, and the universe might conceivably be a collection of such selves, of 
different degrees of inclusiveness, with no absolute unity realized in it at 
all. Thus would a sort of polytheism return upon us —a polytheism which 
I do not on this occasion defend, for my only aim at present is to keep the 
testimony of religious experience clearly within its proper bounds. [James 
(1902/2002), pp. 398-405; emphasis of the author.] 
 
James is arguing, then, that the well-attested testimony of religious 
experiences shows that it is possible to experience – i.e., to have an inti-
mate feeling of – a connection with “something larger than ourselves”. In 
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turn, these experiences have relevant practical effects on those to whom 
they occur – i.e., a change in the orientation of their acting – which are 
empirically verifiable for everybody, even for those who have not had 
these sorts of experiences. And despite not giving verifiable evidence 
that the alleged connection is a genuine connection with an external enti-
ty, James claims that these experiences make it reasonable, in so far as 
they may be explained by it, the hypothesis that there is in fact some-
thing larger than ourselves, different from ourselves — something that 
may be the cause of these experiences by entering into some sort of relation 
with us. And this “something”, James adds, should not necessarily be iden-
tified with the traditional theistic conception of God. Leaving aside the in-
terest that this argument may have in itself, the point I want to stress here 
given the purpose of my paper is that this argument, which James himself 
took as the most significant philosophical contribution of his The Varieties of 
Religious Experience, has clearly nothing to do with either Unamuno’s notion 





Throughout this paper, I have argued that Unamuno’s notion of reli-
gious faith as “querer creer” cannot be identified with William James’s “the 
will to believe”. Like James, Unamuno aimed to offer a nonevidential justi-
fication for religious faith, but whereas James attempted to do so by appeal-
ing to a pragmatic reasoning, Unamuno aimed to offer a natural foundation 
for religious faith by appealing to the (according to Unamuno, natural and 
universal among all singular things) seeking of an endless existence.  
Leaving aside other merits and deficiencies that Unamuno’s reason-
ing may have, one of Unamuno’s merits that makes his work still philo-
sophically relevant today is his ability to construe a defence of religious 
faith by appealing to our not wanting to die, without having to assume 
the truth that God actually exists and that He will bless us with an end-
less existence, and without relying on any sort of pragmatic wager.  
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1 The original Spanish text reads as follows: “El amor espiritual a sí mis-
mo, la compasión que uno cobra para consigo, podrá acaso llamarse egotismo; 
pero es lo más opuesto que hay al egoísmo vulgar. Porque de este amor o com-
pasión a ti mismo, de esta intensa desesperación, porque así como antes de na-
cer no fuiste, así tampoco después de morir serás, pasas a compadecer, esto es, a 
amar a todos tus semejantes y hermanos en aparencialidad, miserables sombras 
que desfilan de su nada a su nada, chispas de conciencia que brillan un momento 
en las infinitas y eternas tinieblas. Y de los demás hombres, tus semejantes, pa-
sando por los que más semejantes te son, por tus convivientes, vas a compade-
cer a todos los que viven, y hasta a lo que acaso no vive, pero existe. Aquella 
lejana estrella que brilla allí arriba durante la noche, se apagará algún día y se ha-
rá polvo, y dejará de brillar y de existir. Y como ella, el cielo todo estrellado. 
¡Pobre cielo! [...] Si llego a compadecer y amar a la pobre estrella que desaparece-
rá del cielo un día, es porque el amor, la compasión, me hace sentir en ella una 
conciencia, más o menos oscura, que la hace sufrir por no ser más que estrella, y 
por tener que dejarlo de ser un día. Pues toda conciencia lo es de muerte y de 
dolor. [...] Y cuando el amor es tan grande y tan vivo, y tan fuerte y desbordante 
que lo ama todo, entonces lo personaliza todo y descubre que el total Todo, que 
el universo es Persona también que tiene una Conciencia, Conciencia que a su 
vez sufre, compadece y ama, es decir, es conciencia. Y a esta Conciencia del 
Universo, que el amor descubre personalizando cuanto ama, es a lo que llama-
mos Dios” [Unamuno (1913b), pp. 191-192]. 
2 When reading Unamuno it is important to bear in mind that he often us-
es “creer” (“believe”) in a non-cognitive way as referring to his conception of re-
ligious faith and not to the acceptance, as a truth, of the factual claim that God 
exists. The following two quotes are an example of Unamuno’s non-cognitivist 
usage of “creer” (“believe”). 
3 The original Spanish text reads as follows: “Y sigo creyendo que si creyése-
mos todos en nuestra salvación de la nada, seríamos todos mejores” [Unamuno 
(1913b), p. 135]. 
4 The original Spanish text reads as follows: “[...] hay que creer en esa otra 
vida para poder vivir ésta y soportarla y darle sentido y finalidad” [Unamuno 
(1913b), p. 261]. 
5 The original Spanish text reads as follows: “¿Quienes se salvan? Ahora 
otra imaginación –ni más ni menos racional que cuantas van interrogativamente 
expuestas–, y es que sólo se salven los que anhelaron salvarse, que sólo se eter-
nicen los que vivieron aquejados de terrible hambre de eternidad y de eterniza-
ción. El que anhela no morir nunca, y cree no haberse nunca de morir en 
espíritu, es porque lo merece, o más bien, sólo anhela la eternidad personal el 
que la lleva ya dentro. No deja de anhelar con pasión su propia inmortalidad, y 
con pasión avasalladora de toda razón, sino aquel que no la merece, y porque no 
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la merece no la anhela. Y no es injusticia no darle lo que no sabe desear, porque 
pedid y se os dará. Acaso se le dé a cada uno lo que deseó. Y acaso el pecado 
aquel contra el Espíritu Santo para el que no hay, según el Evangelio, remisión, 
no sea otro que no desear a Dios, no anhelar eternizarse. [...] ¿Qué crueldad hay 
en negar a uno lo que no deseó o no pudo desear?” [Unamuno (1913b), pp. 
255-256]. Notice that Kerrigan translates “El que anhela no morirse nunca, y 
cree no haberse nunca de morir en espíritu [...]” as “Whoever longs never to die 
and who believes he will never die in spirit [...]”; a more accurate translation of 
this sentence would be: “Whoever longs never to die and who believes he should 
never die in spirit [...]”. 
6 In his “Verdad y vida”, Unamuno says that: “[...] the modern pragma-
tists, headed by William James, judge a scientific truth or principle by their prac-
tical consequences. And when there is one who believes there are inhabitants on 
Saturn they ask him which of the things he does now he would not do, or which 
of the things he does not do that he would do if he did not believe there were 
inhabitants on this planet, or how he would change his behaviour if he changed 
his opinion about this. And if he replies that he would change nothing, they an-
swer back that this is neither to believe anything at all, nor anything that resem-
bles it. But this criterion applied in this way – and I must confess that the 
supreme masters of the school do not take it like this, so sullenly – is unaccept-
ably narrow. The cult of truth for truth itself is one of the exercises that best 
lifts and fortifies the spirit.” My own translation, the original Spanish text reads 
as follows: “[…] los pragmatistas modernos, a cuya cabeza va Guillermo James, 
juzgan de una verdad o principio científico, según sus consecuencias prácticas. Y 
así a uno que dice creer haya habitantes en Saturno le preguntan cuál de las co-
sas que ahora hace no haría o cuál de las que no hace haría en caso de no creer 
que haya habitantes en tal planeta, o en qué se modificaría su conducta si cam-
biase de opinión a tal respecto. Y si contesta que en nada, le replican que ni eso 
es creer cosa alguna ni nada que se le parezca. Pero este criterio así tomado –y 
debo confesar que no lo toman así, tan hoscamente, los sumos de la escuela– es 
de una estrechez inaceptable. El culto a la verdad por la verdad misma es uno de 
los ejercicios que más eleva el espíritu y lo fortifica” [Unamuno (1908), p. 265]. 
7 The original Spanish text reads as follows: “Un día, hablando con un 
campesino, le propuse la hipótesis de que hubiese, en efecto, un Dios que rige 
cielo y tierra, Conciencia del Universo, pero que no por eso sea el alma de cada 
hombre inmortal en el sentido tradicional y concreto. Y me respondió: ‘Enton-
ces, ¿para qué Dios?’ Y así se respondían en el recóndito foro de su conciencia 
el hombre Kant y el hombre James. Sólo que al actuar como profesores tenían 
que justificar racionalmente esa actitud tan poco racional. Lo que no quiere de-
cir, claro está, que sea absurda” [Unamuno (1913b), p. 111]. 
8 The original Spanish text reads as follows: “Mucho han disputado y mu-
cho seguirán todavía disputando los hombres, ya que a sus disputas fue entrega-
do el mundo, sobre el origen del conocimiento; mas dejando ahora para más 
adelante lo que de ello sea en las hondas entrañas de la existencia, es lo averi-
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guado y cierto que en el orden aparencial de las cosas, en la vida de los seres do-
tados de algún conocer o percibir, más o menos brumoso, o que por sus actos 
parecen estar dotados de él, el conocimiento se nos muestra ligado a la necesi-
dad de vivir y de procurarse sustento para lograrlo. Es una secuela de aquella 
esencia misma del ser, que, según Spinoza, consiste en el conato por perseverar 
indefinidamente en su ser mismo. Con términos en que la concreción raya acaso 
en grosería, cabe decir que el cerebro, en cuanto a su función, depende del es-
tómago. [...] Tal es el origen que podemos llamar histórico del conocimiento, sea 
cual fuere su origen en otro respecto. Los seres que parecen dotados de percep-
ción, perciben para poder vivir, y sólo en cuanto para vivir lo necesitan, perci-
ben. [...] [E]l hecho primordial es que la curiosidad brotó de la necesidad de 
conocer para vivir, y éste es el peso muerto y la grosera materia que en su seno 
la ciencia lleva; y es que aspirando a ser un conocer por conocer, un conocer la 
verdad por la verdad misma, las necesidades de la vida fuerzan y tuercen a la 
ciencia a que se ponga al servicio de ellas, y los hombres, mientras creen que 
buscan la verdad por ella misma, buscan de hecho la vida en la verdad. Las va-
riaciones de la ciencia dependen de las variaciones de las necesidades humanas, y 
los hombres de ciencia suelen trabajar, queriéndolo o sin quererlo, a sabiendas o 
no, al servicio de los poderosos o al del pueblo que les pide confirmación de sus 
anhelos. [...] El conocimiento está al servicio de la necesidad de vivir, y primaria-
mente al servicio del instinto de conservación personal. Y esta necesidad y este 
instinto han creado en el hombre los órganos del conocimiento, dándoles el alcan-
ce que tienen. El hombre ve, oye, toca, gusta y huele lo que necesita ver, oír, tocar, 
gustar y oler para conservar su vida” [Unamuno (1913b), pp. 122-123]. 
9 The original Spanish text reads as follows: “Porque decir que el mundo 
es como es y no de otro modo porque Dios así lo hizo, mientras no sepamos 
por qué razón lo hizo así, no es decir nada. Y si sabemos la razón de haberlo así 
hecho Dios, éste sobra, y la razón basta” [Unamuno (1913b), p. 205]. 
10 The original Spanish text reads as follows: “[…] a quien se anhela y se 
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